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Abstract 
 
Innovative systems and infrastructures such as 
smart grids, the internet of things, cities, or highways 
require generally accepted common compatibility 
standards to enable components of such systems to 
interoperate. In some cases, various standards are 
developed by competing standards organizations, 
often resulting in standards battles. This paper 
focuses on factors that affect the outcome of these 
standards battles, and, specifically, on the effect of an 
influential position in an industry-wide standards 
networks and the existence of structural holes in that 
network on standard dominance. The empirical 
context is the consumer electronics, 
telecommunications, and ICT arenas. We conduct a 
study of 103 standards organizations from 2000 to 
2011. We find support for the hypothesis that 
standards that are supported by standards 
organizations that have a central position in the 
industry-wide standards network have a high chance 
of achieving dominance. Thus, we show that apart 
from complementary assets and innovation 
strategies, firms can also adopt specific networking 
strategies to achieve a successful standard. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
A market that is characterized by increasing 
returns to adoption often results in the establishment 
of a single dominant design. One important 
underlying reason for this is the existence of network 
effects, whereby products increase in value the more 
they are adopted by end users [1, 2]. Often, in these 
markets, battles amongst compatibility standards are 
waged resulting in a ‘winner takes all’ situation [3]. 
Standards are essential elements that define 
technological platforms as when single dominant 
standards are established, innovations in the form of 
new platforms may be achieved whereby the 
compatibility standards act as interfaces that ensure 
the interoperability of the distinct components. 
Indeed, as Baldwin and Woodard [4] argue, a 
system’s interfaces as a whole constitute the 
technological platform. 
Examples of standards battles include the battle 
between AC versus DC current, VHS versus 
Betamax, Multimedia compact disc versus Super 
Density Disc, and the more recent Blu-ray versus 
HD-DVD case [3, 5, 6]. Various scholars have 
assessed the outcome of these battles by discussing 
factors for standard dominance [7].  
The topic has been studied from multiple angles. 
Although evolutionary economists argue that 
standards are established through path dependent 
mechanisms and firms cannot directly influence the 
outcome of standards battles [8], industrial 
economists emphasize the importance of market 
mechanisms such as pricing mechanisms, and 
network and bandwagon effects [1, 2]. Technology 
management scholars borrow from industrial 
economists and emphasize the importance of quickly 
building an installed base [3].  They argue that 
resources (e.g. financial resources or reputation) may 
enable a standard supporter to devise certain 
strategies (e.g. timing of entry or marketing) to 
accumulate installed base [9]. Other scholars 
approach the topic from a governance perspective 
[10] or institutional perspective [11]. Recently, 
weights have been established for factors for standard 
dominance for a diverse range of contexts including 
building automation systems and wireless data 
communication [12-14]. 
Although studies have illustrated and analyzed 
the effect of standards network composition on 
standard dominance [5, 6, 15], little has been written 
about the role of the structural characteristics of 
standards networks on the chances that the standards 
achieve dominance (exceptions include [16, 17]. We 
address this gap in the literature and propose that the 
actors that support the standard, and specifically, 
their structural position in an industry-wide standards 
network play an important role in whether this 
standard will reach dominance in the market. 
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Research has shown that networks provide benefits to 
participants in the network. For example, a firm’s 
competitive position may be enhanced by forming 
relationships within the network [18, 19]. Networks 
can provide information and learning benefits to their 
members [20, 21]. We explore these benefits in the 
context of standardization. Specifically, we address 
the question:  what is the influence of the structural 
network position of a standards organization in an 
industry-wide standards network on the chances that 
the standard that is promoted by the standards 
organization achieves dominance?  
In this paper, we distinguish between two types of 
networks; standards organizations and industry-wide 
standards networks. A standards organization is 
defined as a collection of actors that develop and/or 
promote a particular standard. Examples of such 
standards organizations are standards alliances (such 
as the WIFI alliance), and standards committees 
(such as the IEEE802.11 committee). An industry-
wide standards network is the total set of actors 
(standards organizations and or firms) in a specific 
industry, and their relationships. An example is the 
set of firms involved in standards organizations in the 
data communication industry and their relations [22]. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The literature on social and inter-organizational 
networks mentions several benefits of establishing 
inter-organizational relationships in general. Firms 
can gain access to key assets, resources, and 
capabilities, and  they can improve their  strategic 
position through their relationships with other actors 
in the network [18, 19]. These benefits may also 
apply to standards organizations. For example, a 
standard supporter can provide access to 
complementary assets [23] that are essential for 
establishing standard dominance [7]. Such 
complementary assets include reputation and 
financial resources [3]. Moreover, by establishing 
relationships with manufacturers of (key) 
complementary goods [5], firms can gain control 
over the availability and supply of these goods. A 
large availability of complementary goods leads to an 
increase in installed base and to standard dominance 
[24, 25]. Furthermore, inter-organizational 
relationships can lead to collective action and 
coordination of tasks [6, 26], both of which are  
required to create a successful standard. Inter-
organizational relationships can provide access to 
novel information and  facilitate learning among 
actors. In fact, research has indicated that firms 
participating in standards organizations more 
frequently use each other’s patents [27] increasing 
innovation output. Firms can also gain access to tacit 
capabilities [28] or inaccessible knowledge [20] 
through their network partners. 
 
2.1. Influential position 
 
When a standards battle is fought, it mostly 
occurs between rival standards organizations. For 
example, in the battle for a high density optical disk 
standard, Blu-ray battled against HD-DVD. Both 
standards were promoted by rival standards 
organizations. Eventually, Blu-ray won which 
spurred technological innovation in the form of Blu-
ray disc players and gaming consoles, but also in the 
form of complementary goods (movies, games, etc.) 
[29]. The presence of large powerful firms in a 
standards organization is often an incentive for 
smaller firms to join. They strengthen the 
organization by increasing available resources and 
knowledge [23, 30].  Hence, influential firms can 
convince other firms directly or indirectly to join 
standards organizations. However, besides being 
influential in (local) standards organizations, firms 
can also exert influence in an industry-wide standards 
network. They may have sufficient resources to 
participate in multiple standards organizations, and 
by doing so, assume an influential position in the 
industry-wide standards network.  
First, by taking on an influential position in an 
industry-wide standards network, firms can gain 
access to knowledge and information faster and can 
access multiple short paths to other firms and 
standards organizations within the industry-wide 
network. As these members interact with more firms 
and participate in more organizations, they can also 
learn from actors and obtain external knowledge 
[31]. Indeed, it has been argued that a firm’s network 
position positively relates to its innovation output 
[32, 33]. As information diffuses through the network 
from actor to actor, it is important to keep the paths 
to other firms and organizations short as information 
is transmitted faster and with more integrity through 
a network with shorter paths [22, 31]. The electronics 
market is characterized by rapid technological change 
and fast changing consumer preferences, and it is 
therefore important for standards organizations and 
firms to adapt their standards or products swiftly to 
keep up with the pace of technological progress and 
to satisfy consumer needs. Acquiring information 
before the competition can create a competitive 
advantage [34]. By implementing this information 
into the standard, the standard can be adapted to 
customer needs better and will therefore be more 
successful [6].  
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Second, by taking on a central and influential 
position in the network, firms can exert more 
influence on other actors in the network [33] and can 
also spread information to other actors more easily 
[26]. Potential partners can become interested if they 
receive information about the standard and the 
organization behind it through their network [35]. As 
the organization becomes a central point in an 
industry-wide network, its reach becomes larger, 
enabling actors to form more partnerships, and 
enhancing reputation and trust [31]. Through this 
increased exposure, its actions become more visible, 
and the organization can better promote the supported 
standard. The promotion of the standard might 
persuade supporting firms in other (possibly 
competing) standards organizations to join the 
standards organization so that they can use the 
standard in their own products. These new member 
firms can implement the standard in their products, 
thereby increasing the installed base and the number 
of complementary products and positively 
influencing  the chances of standard dominance [25]. 
Hence, we posit that the influential position of the 
members of a standards organization can raise the 
level of influence of the standards organization, 
increasing the chances of success of the standard.  
 
Hypothesis 1: A standard that is supported by a 
standards organization that has a more influential 
position in an industry-wide standards network has a 
higher chance of achieving dominance. 
 
2.2. Structural holes  
 
All ties can provide information, but ties can 
become redundant if the same information comes 
from different ties. Therefore non-redundant ties 
should be fostered, because they can provide 
different information more efficiently [36, 37].  Non-
redundant ties exist when there are few connections 
between separate groups of actors. Due to the limited 
number of connections between the two groups of 
actors, the actors in the different groups possess 
different information. The separations between these 
groups are called structural holes [36]. Structural 
holes can be bridged by actors that have ties with 
both groups. As the different sides of the structural 
hole hold different information, a bridging actor can 
create value by combining information [37]. Firms 
that can successfully bridge these structure holes can 
serve as an obligatory passage point for information 
across the structural hole [38]. Firms active in 
different markets or niches will interact less often 
than firms active in the same market. Structural holes 
will therefore likely exist between different markets 
or niches. 
Structural holes may also exist in industry-wide 
standards networks. The presence of structural holes 
means that only a few connections between the 
groups on different sides of the holes exist. 
Therefore, valuable consumer preference information 
is not available to other standards organizations, but 
only to the standards organization that bridges the 
structural hole. Consequently, this information can 
result in a competitive advantage for the standards 
organization that bridges the structural hole as to 
launch a standard successfully in a new market or 
niche, information about consumer preferences and 
the market environment is needed to determine the 
successful innovation strategy. Furthermore, 
standards organizations that bridge structural holes 
and have access to valuable consumer preference 
information from different markets can use this 
information to adapt the properties of the standard to 
consumer demand in multiple markets.  This would 
enable successful launching of the standards in 
multiple industries, which would increase the 
potential market size of the standard. Furthermore, by 
adapting standards to user requirements, more diverse 
firms will adopt the standard [6]. Launching products 
implementing the standard in different markets 
increases the installed base and the number and 
variety of complementary products, and consequently 
increases the chances of standard dominance [25]. 
Therefore we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A standard that is supported by a 
standards organization that can successfully bridge 
structural holes in the industry-wide standards 
network has a higher chance of achieving dominance 
 
3. Method  
 
This study uses data on standards, standards 
organizations, and firms participating in the 
information technology, consumer electronics and 
telecommunications market in the period from 2000 
to 2011. The data was collected from archived 
websites of standards organizations 
(webarchive.com), press archives, and information 
from databases such as the Lexis-Nexis and Thomson 
One Banker. Examples of standards battles that were 
taken into account are USB vs Firewire and WiFi vs 
HomeRF. These battles were fought in the period 
2000-2011. USB and Firewire define data 
communicatiosn between the PC and peripheral 
devices and HomeRF and WiFi are standards that 
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define wireless data communication. We refer to [39] 
for a more detailed illustration of these cases. 
We represent the standards organizations by the 
members that participate at the highest strategic level 
of the organization. These members can actually 
influence the strategic direction of the organization 
and the standard as they formally approve the 
specifications of the standard. In most standards 
organizations, this is the board of directors. In other 
standards organizations, it is the equivalent highest 
organizational level which has the power to vote. The 
board consists of individuals that represent their 
organization. This study looks at the firms which 
these people represent and takes these firms to be 
board members. 
This study uses a sample of 103 standards 
organizations, which in total constitutes 644 complete 
observations. As the number of standards 
organizations is relatively large compared to the 
average number of observations per standards 
organizations, the results from this analysis will be 
efficient and consistent. 
Using board membership data, we created a 
bipartite network of standards organizations and 
firms. Connections between standards organizations 
and firms are created through board memberships. 
We analyzed this network using the program UCInet. 
As the mathematics used to analyze social networks 
require square matrices, we converted the rectangular 
affiliation data matrices to square matrices by 
calculating the biadjacency matrix; a square matrix of 
dimensions   [40]. 
The network characteristics are operationalized 
using centralities which are normalized to enable 
comparison between the networks. As connections 
are only possible between the two different types of 
actors, the maximum number of connections in the 
biadjacency is lower than the theoretical maximum of 
an ordinary  , and therefore a different 
normalization is necessary which can be calculated 
using the program UCInet.  
We tested the effects of the network 
characteristics on standard dominance by using 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). As the 
database contains data in long format, a regression 
method that could account for repeated 
measurements was necessary. GEE was specifically 
developed to analyze longitudinal data with repeated 
measurements.  It accounts for repeated 
measurements by determining the average effect of 
the independent predictor variables on the dependent 
response variables. In this case, we determined the 
effects of the network characteristics on standard 
dominance. Using GEE, we determined the effects 
averaged out over all standards organizations. 
Dependent variable: Standard Dominance. 
Standard dominance was operationalized by 
determining the number of firms supporting the 
standard. To determine the number of supporting 
firms, we collected the total number of members 
which we have termed network size. We considered 
only corporate members and ignored individual 
members, as the focus of this project is on firms and 
standards organizations. As network characteristics 
are not expected to influence network size 
immediately, the effects of these variables have been 
lagged by one year. This also partially corrects for 
standards organizations that have just been founded 
and have not had time to gain members.  As the 
number of members in standards organizations can 
differ considerably, the distribution of organization 
size is non-normal and positively skewed.  We 
therefore transformed the data by taking the 
logarithm of network size to make the data 
approximately normal.  
Independent variable 1: Influential position. To 
measure the value of the connections to the board 
members, we used eigenvector centrality which 
accounts for both direct and indirect ties. This 
measure of centrality is positively related to social 
capital and has been used to estimate the influence of 
an actor [41]. Eigenvector centrality in bipartite 
graphs has often been used in studies of interlocking 
corporate boards to measure the centrality of the 
actors. 
Independent variable 2: Structural holes. To 
measure the bridging of structural holes for 
hypothesis 2, we used betweenness centrality. To 
calculate betweenness centrality, we calculated all 
possible shortest paths between nodes. Betweenness 
centrality measures how many of these shortest paths 
pass through a node [42]. In the bipartite graph, the 
theoretical maximum number of shortest paths differs 
from the one-mode case, hence a different 
normalization is required.  A node that connects 
structural holes will lie on many of the shortest paths 
connecting the two sides of the hole; consequently 
this node will have a high betweenness centrality 
[40]. Betweenness centrality is highly correlated with 
structural holes [36] and has been used to measure 
access to structural holes [26, 43]. 
Control variable: Year. The intercept for every 
year is flexible. These flexible intercepts have been 
fitted using a categorical year variable. This 
procedure helps to account for exogenous effects 
such as market or environmental factors. As 
standards organizations experience similar events and 
5240
a similar environment in the same year, the year 
could affect the network size in certain years. 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and the 
correlations between the variables. 
 
 
 
The resulting regression coefficients with the 
standard errors are reported in Table 2. In the lower 
part of this table, two goodness-of-fit indicators have 
been added. As GEE estimates the parameters under 
unknown correlation structures, the normal goodness-
of-fit indices cannot be used. Instead, the Quasi 
Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion 
(QIC) and the Corrected Quasi Likelihood under 
Independence Model Criterion (QICC) are used. Both 
these fit indices are extensions of Akaike Information 
Criterion. Smaller QIC and QICC indicate better 
model fit. 
 
 
 
Model 2, which includes structural holes but 
without influential position, resulted in a positive and 
significant regression weight for structural holes. 
However, adding influential position removed this 
significant effect. This change in regression weight 
could be a sign of multicollinearity. This is also 
suggested by the correlations in Table 1, which show 
that influential position and structural holes are 
significantly correlated. We also tested a fourth 
model, which does not include structural holes. This 
model resulted in positive and significant regression 
weight for influential position at a lower QIC score 
but at a higher QICC score. Therefore, it cannot be 
indisputably determined whether this model is an 
improvement over Model 3.All models that include 
influential position result in positive and significant 
regression weights, even at a very high confidence 
interval. Furthermore, we can conclude from the QIC 
and QICC scores that adding influential position 
results in a better fitting model than the variable 
intercept baseline model. 
Therefore, we find support for the positive effects 
of the influential position of the standards 
organization in the network on the success of the 
standards organization and find support for 
Hypothesis 1. This implies that successful standards 
organizations are positioned in an influential position 
in the network of standards organizations and firms. 
For hypothesis 2, the effect of structural holes in the 
industry-wide standards network on standard 
dominance, we found insufficient support. It should 
be remarked that the literature on structural holes has 
reached no consensus on the effects of structural 
holes. One school of thought formed by Burt and 
others proposes that value can be created if structural 
holes are bridged [36, 37]. Another school of thought 
emphasizes the trust generation function of networks. 
A network without structural holes facilitates the 
generation of trust. As all actors are connected to 
each other, opportunistic behavior can be punished 
through collective action [44]. Following this line of 
thought, one would assume that a network with 
structural holes would be less efficient in sharing 
information. Standards organizations that bridge 
structural holes may be faced with members that do 
not trust each other, which would negatively affect 
the performance of the standard. Ahuja [37] also 
finds evidence for the negative effects of structural 
holes. As evidence for both schools of thought has 
been found, it is possible that bridging structural 
holes might affect the standards organization both 
positively and negatively. Hence, the total effect of 
bridging structural holes may indeed be zero. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
This paper focuses on factors that affect the 
outcome of standards battles. We have studied the 
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influence of structural aspects of industry-wide 
standards networks on standard dominance. We have 
analyzed data from a dataset consisting of standards, 
standards organizations, and firms participating in 
these organizations, covering the period from 2000 to 
2011. We found that a standards organization’s 
influential position in an industry-wide standards 
network positively affects the chances that its 
standard achieves dominance. This is one of the first 
studies that relates structural network characteristics 
to standard dominance. So, for a standards 
organization that is developing and promoting 
standards for e.g. the internet of things it is important 
to have an influential position in the industry-wide 
standards network as it then has a higher chance of 
achieving success with its standard. 
This research has several theoretical implications 
For  innovation management in general and standards 
and dominant designs in particular. First, although 
the effect of the composition of standards networks in 
relation to standard dominance has been researched 
in several case studies of standards battles [5, 6], we 
focus on the effect of network structure on standard 
dominance; a topic that has been scarcely studied. 
Secondly, longitudinal studies of standards networks 
are lacking (one exception is Soh [33]). Our study 
covers the period 2000-2011 and takes into account 
the various changes that took place in the industry-
wide standards network during this period. Third, the 
effect of a standards organization’s influential 
position in an industry-wide standards network on 
standard dominance has not been studied before. We 
show that a standards organization’s influential 
position in an industry-wide network positively 
affects the chances that its standard achieves 
dominance. Finally, this study provides additional 
support for the notion that the outcome of standards 
battles is not fully characterized by path dependency, 
but that standard supporters can influence the 
outcome. This is in line with results from prior 
studies [24]. 
This research also has managerial implications. 
Our results imply that support from influential firms 
is needed to achieve a successful standard. Earlier 
research has already indicated that firms with good 
reputation and sales affect the success of standards 
[45]. Our study indicates that besides these static 
resources, it is important for a standards organization 
to have members that are active in an industry-wide 
network. To a certain extent, these effects will 
accompany each other as powerful and influential 
firms produce many products and therefore have 
incentives to join many standards organizations. In 
our findings, we see that the firms scoring the highest 
on eigenvector centrality, used to measure influential 
position, are well-known companies who are industry 
leaders (examples are Dell, Intel, Microsoft, 
Samsung, and Sony). Firms that develop standards 
for e.g. the internet of things should actively involve 
these industry leaders early in the standardization 
process as they can exert influence in an industry-
wide standards network. 
A limitation is that all ties of the industry-wide 
network have been modeled as being equally strong. 
Although all firms in the board can participate in the 
decision making of the standards organization, some 
firms might be more influential in this process. Large 
firms or firms with specific capabilities and assets 
might be able to exert more influence on the 
development of the standard. Firms may participate 
in the board of multiple standards organizations, but 
their activity in these boards could differ. For 
example, firms might be more actively involved in a 
standards organization when the standard is more 
important to the firm. Future research could attempt 
to model these ties as ties of different strength. This 
information, however, is often not available. Even if 
this information was available, it would be difficult to 
use as many network measures do not exist for 
valued networks [40]. Another limitation is related to 
the operationalization of standard dominance in terms 
of the number of firms. Future research could attempt 
to measure standard dominance more precise by 
incorporating the size of the firms or even 
incorporating the consumer perspective and 
effectively operationalize standard dominance in 
terms of market share per standard. Furthermore, we 
focus on firms and standards organizations that are 
active in the telecommunications, information 
technology, and consumer electronics industry. The 
question arises whether the results of our study are 
specific for these particular industries or whether 
similar results might apply for other industries. 
Future research could explore this in more depth. 
Finally, this study focuses on network structural 
characteristics and their effect on standard 
dominance. Future research could study the effect of 
other aspects of the network that might affect 
standard dominance such as its composition, the 
strength of ties between actors within a standards 
organization (in terms of e.g. the number of repeated 
interactions), attunement or coordination in the 
standards organization. 
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